It took place on Sunday, April 26 the official visit of the President of Moldova, Maia Sandu, to Kyiv, dedicated to the anniversary of the Chernobyl tragedy. However, the current context is much deeper: both countries are in a state of waiting for negotiations to join the EU. From the very beginning, Chisinau and Kyiv have been working as a “tandem”, although even a year ago in the diplomatic circles, they were seriously discussing the separation of their trajectories and the horizon of accession. Now they don’t mention decoupling. At least out loud.
Transnistria became a separate subject of Sandu’s meeting with the Ukrainian side. Not so long ago, Kishinev publicly presented the idea of external management of the territory for the transition period for the first time. Although it was in the form of a vision, it became a clear enough signal to be no longer just an internal discussion. Sandu confirmed her intention to join Coalitions of the willing — for now as a political signal, the details of which have to be worked out.
Kishinev is gradually but consistently expanding its own foreign policy horizon, not breaking away from Kyiv, but rather relying on it. Where in this architecture are the real limits of the possible, in an interview for LB.ua said Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine to the Republic of Moldova Paun Rogovei.
Mr. Ambassador, how do you assess the visit of President Maia Sandu to Kyiv? What was the main topic of the negotiations?
It was an extremely important and timely visit, because Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova are states of the same region that face similar challenges of a security nature. The main one is the aggression of the Russian Federation: for Ukraine – in the form of a full-scale war, for Moldova – as a constant hybrid pressure, primarily in the information sphere.
Such meetings are important for both sides, as they allow not only to reconcile positions, but also to deepen the coordination of actions in key areas.
Please tell me if there was key the topic of European integration? Last year, talks continued about the decoupling of Ukraine from Moldova. Today we hear different things.
Yes, the topic of European integration is really one of the key ones. This logically follows from the general context of cooperation between Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova as candidate countries for joining the European Union, which are in similar conditions of reforms and security challenges.
Earlier in the public discourse, there were sometimes speculations about the “diversification of trajectories”, or the so-called decoupling. At the same time, at the official level, this logic was never established as a political position.
Today, we actually see confirmation of the approach that assumes synchronous movement of Ukraine and Moldova in the European integration process. The visit to Kyiv and the corresponding political signals only emphasize that it is about a conscious strategy — partnership moving forward as a tandem, not competition or separation.
Kishinev intends to join the Coalition of the Willing. Perhaps you know the details of how Chisinau sees its involvement and what it could be involved in?
At this stage, it is more about a political signal than an agreed model of participation. The public announcement of the intention to join the relevant formats is in itself an important indicator of convergence of positions, but the practical configuration of such participation still needs to be worked out.
In this context, the participation of the Republic of Moldova, a neighboring state, can potentially have a primarily indirect but important dimension — in particular, in the area of economic interaction, logistics chains, regional stability and energy security.
At the same time, there is no detailed model of such interaction, and the parties are at the stage of initial discussion of possible approaches. It is obvious that Moldova has yet to formulate its own vision of the format of engagement, which could correspond to its foreign policy priorities and internal resource capabilities.
Thus, we can talk about the political readiness for dialogue within the framework of this initiative, while the specific parameters of participation remain the subject of further elaboration.
And in Ukraine there are some expectations at the level of experts, where would be useful Moldova?
At the expert level, the expected role of the Republic of Moldova within the framework of the relevant initiative has not yet been worked out.
First, formalization and details of potential engagement formats are expected from Chisinau. Only after that, it is possible to launch a professional discussion about possible areas of participation and added value.
During Ms. Sandu’s visit to Kyiv, the details of the idea were announced external administration of Transnistria for the transit period. Of course, everything is at the level of vision, but this is a new interesting nuance. How can this be implemented and which European countries (if you know) can be involved in such a scenario? Is this a Bosnian scenario for a separate territory or some other mechanism?
The issue of settlement of the Transnistrian conflict belongs to the exclusive competence of the Republic of Moldova, and it is Chisinau that determines any formats, including conceptual approaches to transitional or institutional mechanisms.
On the Ukrainian side, the position is stable and consistent: support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova within internationally recognized borders, as well as exclusively peaceful settlement of all related issues. This is the basic framework principle that has not been changed.
And how do you feel, do European partners have a consensus regarding the concept presented by the Moldovan side?
This is a separate topic for consultation between official Chisinau and European partners. From the point of view of the interests of Ukraine, yes, it is in our interests, since the current 5-2 negotiation format is dysfunctional due to the presence in its composition of the aggressor state, which for 30 years did everything possible to prevent the resolution of this conflict.
The European Union could play a key role in the political settlement of this problem. But I will repeat again – the key role here belongs to the Moldovan side.
The European Union is a participant in the currently de jure 5 2 format as an observer. Since the Republic of Moldova has embarked on the path of European integration, it is logical that the EU should play a more active role in this process. In which status is the competence of Chisinau and Brussels alone.
In Moldova, it is often said that the Transnistrian issue should be part of the Ukrainian negotiation package in the context of ending the war…
Ukraine is focused on its own negotiation process, which is about ending the war waged by the Russian Federation against Ukraine. The focus is exclusively on issues directly related to the Ukrainian agenda in the sphere of security, sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Russia recently announced its intention to “protect its citizens abroad.” It is also about Transnistria. How realistic is this threat? Do you see any possible escalation in their actions? How are the Russians currently acting in the security sphere, in Transnistria in particular?
We record primarily statements of a political nature. We are currently not observing any specific actions or changes in the security situation that could be qualified as escalating.
At the same time, it is worth understanding that such rhetoric of the Russian Federation is not a new practice and has been used repeatedly in various contexts. Ukraine already has the experience of interacting with similar statements and accordingly evaluates them in combination with real actions, not declarations.
That is, all this at the level of rhetoric and threats?
This remains mostly at the level of rhetorical statements and threats.
At the same time, there can be no underestimation in the approach to such signals. It is about the established practice of the Russian Federation to use public political declarations as an element of pressure and informational influence. That is why it is important not to ignore such statements, even if they are not accompanied by concrete practical steps.
Accordingly, emphasis is placed on constant monitoring of the situation, exchange of information with partners and readiness for timely response in order to prevent any potential provocations.
And how would you describe the position of the administration in Transnistria. Political consultations in the format of one plus one (Kyshinov — Tiraspol. — Ed.) have intensified, while Russia is sharpening its rhetoric. Where is Tiraspol headed? Does he seek dialogue with Chisinau
The current position of the de facto administration in Tiraspol remains inertial and does not change significantly compared to previous periods.
The key element of their approach remains the insistence on the 5 2 format, which actually means the desire to preserve or restore the role of the Russian Federation as a full-fledged participant in the negotiation process. Such a line does not find the support of the majority of other participants and does not contribute to the promotion of a real settlement.
As for the consultations in the 1 1 format between Chisinau and Tiraspol, they are mostly technical and limited and do not show a significant breakthrough in the political dimension. The constructive potential of these contacts is currently restrained.
At the same time, the internal political context in the region, including the approach of the so-called election processes, also affects the behavior of local structures, causing a certain caution and reduced activity at this stage.
In a broader plan, it can be stated that the influence of the Russian Federation on political and elite processes in this region remains significant, and it is he who largely determines the framework of decision-making by the de facto administration.
Will Russia strengthen the presence of its security forces in the administration of Tiraspol, or will it happen anyway anyone local?
First of all, it should be noted that the possibilities of direct personnel export to this region in the Russian Federation are significantly limited, in particular, due to the lack of regular rotation and changes in the practical conditions of presence.
A more likely scenario seems to be the reproduction of management contours from among the local political and administrative groups that already function in this system. At the same time, their activity, as before, may depend to one degree or another on external influence and political orientation towards Moscow.
Therefore, it is not about direct replacement by external personnel, but about preserving or renewing the inner circle of persons who operate in the already formed structure of influence.
Regarding the very nature of these processes, the Ukrainian position remains unchanged: any similar procedures are not recognized and are considered exclusively through the prism of international legal norms and principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova.
An important role in balancing the energy crisis in Transnistria in 2025 played back Hungary provided intermediary financial mechanisms for the supply of Russian gas. Will it affect Transnistria? change of power in Hungary? Will this model of Russian energy supplies to Transnistria change?
In this matter, I cannot make objective assumptions about possible changes in the policy of individual states or modification of already existing energy mechanisms without confirmed official decisions.
We can only state the fact that any such supply models or intermediary financial schemes are derived from the political decisions of the respective governments and are governed by their sovereign competences. In practical terms, such issues are always the subject of bilateral or multilateral consultations and depend on the political will of the respective parties.
Marianna Prysiazhnyuk, journalist
