The saga of the presidential elections in Moldova has concluded with Maia Sandu’s victory, delaying the risk of having a “second Georgia” on Ukraine’s borders for at least a year—until the parliamentary race in 2025. Current President Maia Sandu, candidate from the “Action and Solidarity” party, won 55% of the vote, defeating the pro-Russian Socialist Party candidate, former Prosecutor General Alexander Stoianoglo, who received 44% of the vote. However, the results of both rounds show that despite the pro-European forces’ victory, Moldova’s situation remains complex.
Firstly, Sandu’s victory was primarily ensured by the diaspora’s votes, while actual sentiments within the country lean toward the pro-Russian candidate. Secondly, low support for the current government within Moldova, especially while Ukraine is at war and Kremlin’s influence is strong, could have uncontrollable consequences at a critical moment. Thirdly, the personal sympathies and antipathies of Moldovan politicians sometimes hold more sway than geopolitical calculations.
Day X
The victory of incumbent President Maia Sandu became clear on Sunday evening when polling stations closed, although the final results were announced only by Monday morning: she led her opponent, the socialist candidate Alexander Stoianoglo, with more than 55% to his 44%.
The second-round results were anxiously awaited, with suspense lasting to the end: in the first round, a referendum on constitutional amendments to secure the country’s irreversible European path nearly failed, receiving just minimal support—less than 1%. This outcome served as a wake-up call for Sandu’s team and the pro-European part of the country, as it was meant to mobilize the pro-European electorate in her favor, while Moscow’s candidate seemed to have all the tools for a confident win.
Despite Sandu’s success, internal sentiments remain ambivalent: most citizens in Moldova voted for Alexander Stoianoglo. His strongest support came from Gagauzia, his home region, but other areas that previously supported Sandu also voted this time for a candidate promising closer ties with Moscow—even Sandu’s home district of Fălești.
The incumbent president’s advantage was secured by the diaspora’s votes, mobilized on an unprecedented scale. Stoianoglo’s campaign, on the other hand, relied on votes from a vote-buying network established months before the election. It also counted on voters living in Russia, occupied Transnistria, and traditional pro-Russian strongholds like Gagauzia. Russia maximized its resources, organizing Stoianoglo’s voters not only in Russia but also in Belarus and Azerbaijan.
With a record turnout of 54% by the time polling stations closed, these votes became the pro-European candidate’s last hope for victory.
A Springboard for Parliamentary Elections
The pro-European forces’ win in the presidential campaign is only a victory in one battle, not the war. The true struggle for influence in Moldova, which is a parliamentary republic, will unfold in next year’s parliamentary elections. And currently, the prospects for pro-Russian forces appear clearer than for pro-European ones.
Firstly, candidates who garnered over 5% in the first round of the presidential election could aim for further competition. In addition to Sandu and Stoianoglo, such politicians include Renato Usatîi, leader of Our Party, who came third in the first round, and Irina Vlah, Bashkan (head) of the autonomous region of Gagauzia, whose results also exceeded 5%.
Secondly, there are several forces in Moldova that did not field a candidate in the presidential election but are actively building support. Particular attention should be given to Ion Ceban, the mayor of Chișinău, a former socialist and current leader of the National Alternative Movement (MAN) party, positioning himself as pro-European. However, in Moldova, Ceban is often viewed as an opportunistic politician. There is also the pro-European Împreună (“Together”) bloc, whose candidate Octavian Țîcu received only 1% in the first round but has time to accumulate political influence.
The main question for the parliamentary season is who will align with whom. A geopolitical split is likely to persist, but which alliances will pro-European and pro-Russian parties form remains a complex issue. Sandu’s “Action and Solidarity” party currently holds a majority in parliament, but it is unlikely to repeat this result. Therefore, the political context will depend not only on election outcomes but also on alliances that could turn a geopolitical choice into legislative capability.
Sandu’s Secret Supporter
Although Stoianoglo lost the presidential race, he is now the country’s main opposition figure, and much will depend on his future decisions and actions. What is concerning is not so much his geopolitical orientation toward an aggressor state, but his relations with the Socialist Party.
For the Socialists, who have long been the primary political project advancing Kremlin interests in Moldova, support for Stoianoglo was not straightforward from the start. The result of the first round—a joint achievement of both the party’s image and Stoianoglo, a former prosecutor general who faced pressure from the current government—was at 27%.
Sandu and Dodon are traditional rivals, particularly in presidential contests, having competed in 2016 when Dodon won, and in 2020, when Sandu won (with diaspora support). However, the pro-Russian forces, who became highly toxic following Russia’s 2022 aggression against Ukraine, needed new momentum and fresh faces, so Moscow sought a new favorite.
For Dodon, who resigned his parliamentary mandate to retain presidential status in politics, this decision by his backers likely led to disappointment. Years of loyalty as a “soldier of the Russian world” put Dodon through a difficult journey: first a humiliating defeat by Sandu, then competing for loyalty with Kremlin’s new favorite, fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor, whose “Shor” party has grown in Moldova with Russian support, and finally, the necessity to support an outsider candidate, Alexander Stoianoglo.
Now, circumstances suggest that this outsider candidate could leave Dodon without his creation—the Socialist Party, which, with its extensive network and significant support, demonstrated its legitimacy through Stoianoglo’s win across Moldova.
Thus, despite his declarative support for Stoianoglo, perhaps no one was more quietly rooting for the “detestable” yet familiar Maia Sandu than Igor Dodon himself.
This material was created with CFI’s involvement, Agence française de développement médias, as part of the Hub Bucharest Project with the support of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
