On Thursday, March 12, the president Volodymyr Zelenskyi visited Bucharest. On the one hand, this visit looks like a logical stop on the way to Paris, which the Ukrainian president is visiting after the Romanian capital, especially since in Bucharest the heads of state signed a declaration on strategic partnership, cooperation in the energy sector and joint production of drones.
On the other hand, against the background of worsening relations with Hungary, the conversation with the Romanian leadership obviously has a much wider meaning than just transit.
Details – in the material LB.ua.
Romanian transit
Zelenskyi’s meeting with Romanian leaders took place on the eve of his visit to France, at a time when the regional security configuration around Ukraine is once again in a phase of rethinking. In Bucharest, the Ukrainian president held talks with President Nikushor Dan and Prime Minister Ilie Bolozhan. During the full-scale war, this is Zelenskyi’s second Romanian tour. The first visit took place in 2023, when the parties agreed on a framework for a strategic partnership between the two countries.
Based on the results of the current consultations, the presidents signed three strategic documents: a declaration on joint production in the field of defense (production of drones), an agreement on cooperation in the field of energy, and a document on strategic partnership.
According to DW Română’s interlocutors in the Romanian authorities, the signing of these documents took place only now, two years after the previous discussions, after Kyiv agreed to Bucharest’s conditions regarding education in the Romanian language for its ethnic community.
In the two years between these two visits, Romanian interest — both in Ukraine and in Eurocentric approaches, particularly in the field of security and geopolitical processes — began to decline. It is symbolic that Nikushor Dan was not among the distinguished guests who visited Kyiv on the fourth anniversary of the great war. He also did not appear at the key European events at the beginning of the year, in particular at the forum in Davos and the Munich Security Conference.
All this adds to the dilemma, which increasingly clearly defines Bucharest’s foreign policy line and at the same time casts a shadow over bilateral relations with Ukraine. On the one hand, there is a long-term strategic partnership with the USA in the region. On the other hand, membership in the EU and the need for priority European coordination dictated by geography and close proximity to a country at war.
However, this strategic perspective does not cancel the actual challenges. One of them is an aggressive election campaign in Hungary. Although it was not officially discussed, it is hard to imagine that Volodymyr Zelenskyi and his Romanian counterparts did not exchange views on this matter. All the more so since Romania itself has been forced to administer similar political tensions over the years — primarily in the context of Budapest’s active policy in Transylvania and the use of the region to strengthen its own political positions. For Kyiv, this experience of Bucharest is indicative as well as Romania’s ability to balance and normalize relations with Hungary, as well as support in emergency situations in which Kyiv found itself, thanks to escalation of Ukrainian-Hungarian relations.
Hungarian factor
These relations have never been simple, but they began to take on an open confrontation after Budapest’s public attacks on Kyiv and Volodymyr Zelensky’s sharp responses during his speeches in European capitals. It was the peak of the escalation detention of Ukrainian tax collectors in Hungary, as well as the blocking of a 90 billion euro loan to Ukraine, approved by the European Council back in December 2025.
Although the parties did not publicly discuss the Hungarian issue, certain assurances from the Romanian authorities were nevertheless voiced. In particular, Nikushor Dan noted that Romania would support any legal decision that would allow the unblocking of 90 billion approved by the European Union for aid to Ukraine, which was decided at the end of 2025.
This is an extremely serious issue — a loan that should allow Ukraine, on the one hand, in the civil sphere, and especially in the military, to respond to the needs it has. Therefore, it is unacceptable that a decision made in the format of 27 countries should be appealed after two, three or four weeks,” said the Romanian leader.
Nikushor Dan said that Ukraine will fully support Romania in overcoming Hungary’s veto on the allocation of a European loan.
As you know, a meeting of the European Council will be held a week from today. Ukraine and this specific issue are included in the agenda of this meeting. The European Commission will offer several legal options to get out of this impasse. And Romania will support any legal option that will allow to get out of the blockade (from the side of Hungary and Slovakia — ed.), because, I repeat, it is impossible that a decision that has already been taken should be questioned later,” explained Nikushor Dan.
It must be said that the Hungarian factor is important for the internal politics of Romania. The Democratic Union of Hungarians of Romania (UDMR), which represents the Hungarian community in Romania and traditionally maintains close ties with the Fidesz party, operates in the country. Its leader, Keleman Hunor, criticized the day before Zelensky for aggressive rhetoric towards Orban. Orban himself calls Keleman Hunor “the guarantor of stability and common sense in Bucharest.”
Keleman Hunor also recently published an eloquent post about the “one Hungarian nation,” which is actually Budapest’s key narrative in the context of ethnic Hungarian policy abroad.
In October 2025, Viktor Orban attended the congress of the UDMR party. During this event, along with the official symbols of Romania and Hungary, the flag of the Szeklerland (Romanian: Ținutul Secuiesc) was also used. This flag, inspired by the 1601 version of Prince Moses Szekej, symbolizes the unity of the eight Szekej regions and is used as a symbol of support for the idea of Hungarian autonomy in Transylvania, which is of course a very sensitive issue in Romania.
And one of the recent scandals was the use of Romanian schoolchildren in campaigns related to the support of Fidesz policies, in particular to collect signatures in favor of Orbán.
However, there is a fundamental difference between these situations. Romania and Hungary are in symmetrical positions with respect to each other — both countries are members of the EU and NATO. Ukraine is in a different configuration, where its European future largely depends on the ability to normalize relations with Hungary. And Romania understands this from its own experience. That is why the question seems logical: where, if not in Bucharest, should Kyiv seek advice on the normalization of relations with Budapest
Useful Trumpism
Zelenskyi’s last visit to Romania was marked by a scandal, due to which his speech in the parliament was canceled. Then the scandalous figure, deputy Diana Shoshoake, threatened to disrupt this speech if it took place. The plan for this year’s meeting was less ambitious—at least publicly. But the reaction of the far-right parties could become a problem again, especially given the growing support of their flagship party AUR (up to 38% according to the INSCOP poll of March 9 this year).
On the eve of the visit, numerous discrediting messages were circulated on social networks. However, one strategic decision of the Romanian authorities actually changed this context. On the eve of the meeting with Zelensky, a meeting of the National Security Council (CSAT) was held under the chairmanship of Nikushor Dan, at which a decision was made to allow the US Air Force to use Romanian military bases in the war against Iran. On the same day, the decision was supported at a joint meeting of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, which drew criticism from far-right forces that did not vote for it, including AUR leader George Simion.
In addition to the far-reaching consequences for Romanian-American relations — especially in view of the recent decision of the United States to reduce its military presence in the country — this decision was also an important political circumstance against which the meeting with Zelensky took place. It is quite likely that this visit could also become the subject of large-scale campaigns about “drawing Romania into war” or “drawing into confrontation with Hungary” – narratives that have recently been shaped into a local adaptation of Romanian “Trumpism”.
However, as it turned out, such Trumpism was attractive to the same Simion only when it was possible to effectively cut a cake in the shape of Greenland on camera. When it came to the real issue of military bases, his reaction was the opposite. In a purely Ukrainian-Romanian context, this significantly limited the opportunities to discredit Zelenskyi’s visit itself.
