Since Russia’s full-scale aggression against Ukraine, the resolution of the Transnistrian conflict has shifted to a practical framework—a 1+1 dialogue between Chisinau and the separatist administration in Tiraspol. This change sidelines many interested parties, including Ukraine. However, in a conversation with LB.ua, the EU Special Representative for the Transnistrian Settlement and Head of the European External Action Service (EEAS) for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, and Moldova, Dorota Dlouhi-Suliga, emphasized that Ukraine’s role in resolving the Transnistrian issue is inevitable, and the EU will have to finance this process because “there is simply no alternative.”
At the same time, Dorota Dlouhi-Suliga stressed that the first step toward reintegration must be the withdrawal of Russian troops from the region, after which the integration of the population into Moldova’s political system can be addressed
However, as long as the war in Ukraine continues, neither the withdrawal of Russian troops nor the restructuring of the frozen 5+2 negotiation format is possible.
Let’s start with the 5+2 negotiation format: how do you assess the role of the Russian Federation in this process, especially after 2022?
For us, the 5+2 format is completely frozen; it’s an inactive negotiation process. It is impossible to negotiate peace with a state that is at war and occupies other countries in the region. However, we are retaining certain elements of the format related to the OSCE because we believe in its usefulness. The OSCE remains an important player in the region, supporting the peacekeeping mission and contributing to overall stability.
Background: The 5+2 format, established in 2005, is a negotiation mechanism for resolving the Transnistrian conflict. The name reflects the participants involved: the conflicting parties—Moldova and Transnistria (the separatist administration in Tiraspol); mediators—Russia, Ukraine, and the OSCE; and observers—the EU and the USA. Since Russia’s full-scale aggression against Ukraine in 2022, the 5+2 format has been effectively frozen because it is impossible to fulfill a peacekeeping function while simultaneously engaging in aggression.
The most significant developments now are the direct interactions between Chisinau and Tiraspol—the constitutional authorities of Moldova and the de facto leadership in Tiraspol. These exchanges help maintain stability, ensure security, and prevent escalations. We actively support Chisinau in these efforts.
Since the start of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, Moldova’s leadership has faced a challenging situation due to the presence of Russian troops in Transnistria and the uncontrolled portion of its territory. Nevertheless, they have acted responsibly, taking measures and maintaining contact with Ukraine on issues related to the situation in Transnistria. Ambassador Rogovey plays a crucial role, facilitating discussions on security and stability among Kyiv, Chisinau, and Tiraspol.
Do you think Kyiv is satisfied with the fact that the dialogue has increasingly shifted to a 1+1 format, which before the full-scale aggression might have been seen as less acceptable given the number of interested parties?
To some extent, this approach has proven beneficial, especially now, when it is impossible to hold any negotiations with the Russian Federation. Kyiv supports this dialogue but would like to stay informed about developments and be assured that no threats are emerging from this region.
Let’s not forget that, due to the peculiarities of the Soviet-era energy system and the routes of energy infrastructure, there are important communications passing through, for example, Odessa and Transnistria. Chisinau’s actions regarding electricity supply from the left bank are also of great importance to Ukraine. In this context, Ambassador Rogovey’s role is particularly crucial. He regularly visits Tiraspol to ensure Kyiv is kept in the loop, and Chisinau understands the necessity of close cooperation with Ukraine to control the situation.
How do you evaluate the role of Transnistrian so-called elites since the beginning of the full-scale invasion? Has their attitude toward Moldova, Ukraine, Russia, or the EU changed?
I believe they generally understand that they are in an extremely difficult situation. Previously, there was significant illicit trade across the border with Ukraine. Some corrupt elites in Tiraspol profited from this, as did some corrupt individuals on the Ukrainian side of the border—a well-known fact. Their activities created very challenging conditions for maintaining regional security and the economy.
These elites have always depended on Russia, while simultaneously trying to balance their interests. Tiraspol cannot be considered a monolith, but I think pragmatism dominates in the region. Many residents of Transnistria hold multiple passports, underscoring their pragmatism. Their primary goal is to ensure stability and minimize risks for their population, avoiding involvement in the war.
Do you think it is possible to transform the 5+2 format, and what role could Ukraine play in this process?
At some point, I believe we will arrive at a new format, but that’s my personal opinion. It all depends on how the war ends. We hope Ukraine will win and restore its territorial integrity. Afterward, the negotiation format will depend on the conditions of the agreements reached.
Ukraine will always play a critical role in this process. Even now, Ukraine and Moldova are moving together toward the European Union. Such a situation is unacceptable in Europe, especially in the center of the future EU. Therefore, Ukraine will undoubtedly play a key role in resolving this conflict.
Do you think the new Trump administration could influence this process?
I don’t recall any statements from Trump about Moldova. I don’t think Moldova is currently a priority for the new administration, so it’s difficult to predict what actions might be possible.
Could the EU fund Transnistria’s reintegration into Moldova?
The financial aspect is undoubtedly important, but not the most critical. As you rightly pointed out, military forces must leave Moldova’s territory—that’s the first and necessary step. Second, it is vital to understand how the population of the region will be integrated into the country’s electoral system, which is also crucial.
Additionally, many practical issues must be addressed: transitioning to a unified currency, integrating banking systems, educational systems, state structures, the police, etc. Before discussing specific sums—certainly significant—all these aspects must be considered.
